The task here is to outline a general-equilibrium model in which, at any point in time, some individuals will marry, others will divorce, and yet others will choose to have out-of-wedlock births. While the model is still prototypical in nature, it will be shown how such a framework can be used to address public-policy questions, in particular, the impact of welfare on family structure and the well-being of the economy. 
7. Marriage and Divorce.-Imagine that a young female of type x meets a young male of type z in the marriage market and that their match is quality y. Will they marry or not? Marriage requires mutual consent, so each party must prefer married life to single life. Suppose that the expected lifetime utility of single life for the female is GI(x) while the expected lifetime utility from marriage is Wl(x, z, y). She will desire to marry if WI(x, z, y) ' G 1 (x), and to remain single otherwise. Her mate is also comparing the expected lifetime utility from marriage, H1(x, z, y), with the expected lifetime utility from bachelorhood, Bj(z). Thus, for a marriage to occur it must happen that both W1(x, z, y) ? GI(x) and HI(x, z, y) ? B1(z).
The decision for old agents is analogous. For example, suppose that the young couple above decided to get married and have k children. Next period let his type evolve to z', hers to x', and match quality transit to y'. The female will divorce her spouse if her happiness from single life, G2(x', k), exceeds the utility she will realize from remaining married, W2(x', z', ', kc). A divorce will transpire if either W2(x', z', ', k) < G2(X', k) or H2(x', z', y', k) < B2(z', k).
8. Young Women on Welfare.-It is now easy to see that the expected lifetime utility for a young single woman on welfare will be given by 2. Welfare Dependence.-In the U.S. data, a girl who grew up with a mother on welfare has about a 58-percent chance of living on welfare when she grows up. This compares with 27 percent for a girl who grew up in a family that never received welfare. Now turn to the model. A welfare mother's income is much less than that earned by a married couple. On average her income is only 7.5 percent of that enjoyed by a married couple. Not surprisingly, the level of human-capital investment in a child by a welfare mother is considerably smaller than for a married couple, about 75 percent less. This occurs because a welfare mother has both less income and more children to spread her time and money over. This leads to welfare dependence across generations. Since a welfare mother invests relatively little in her daughter, when the latter grows up she is less likely to marry than a girl from a two-parent home and therefore more likely to live on welfare.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 2 , which is a graph of data generated by the model. The downward-sloping curve plots the relationship between parental investment in a daughter, or and the probability that she will receive welfare sometime in her life. The upward-sloping curve shows how parental investment in a daughter depends positively on the family's lifetime income (the relationship is inverted on the diagram). Thus, a family with lifetime income y' invests e' in a daughter, who has the probability p' of receiving welfare sometime. The probability of receiving welfare sometime decreases with lifetime family income. The pattern of welfare dependence that emerges is portrayed in Table 1 pool, begins to rise. Since married couples have fewer children on average, the population's annualized growth rate drops to -1.5 percent. Last, the average level of income rises by 24 percent. The effects of eliminating welfare take time to occur. Figure 3 plots the model's transitional dynamics (a period is 10 years). In the short run, women have lower average expected utility. In the initial generation, young women are willing to give up 2.5 percent of their consumption (the compensating variation) in order to return to the old welfare system (see Fig. 3C ). It takes about 70 years before they are better off, on average. The fourth panel plots the evolution of the utility distribution for females. While on average women are better off in the new steady state, a significant number (about 25 percent) are worse off (the unproductive, unmarried). There is short-run pain in the sense that the benchmark economy's utility distribution stochastically dominates the one that occurs after ten years; that is, there are more young women at low expected utility levels after 10 years than in the benchmark economy. Last, the number of lowtype women declines slowly (Fig. 3B) 
